Solia saysProposer-builder separation has the proposer sign a builder’s block HEADER first and receive the full body only on reveal — concentrating MEV expertise in builders while keeping proposer revenue.
Proposer-builder separation (PBS) carves out MEV extraction from block proposing. Builders assemble blocks optimized for MEV; proposers (validators) auction off their slot to the highest-paying builder by signing that builder’s block header. The builder reveals the block body only after the proposer commits — so the proposer cannot copy and steal the MEV strategy.
Today this runs out-of-protocol via MEV-Boost and trusted relayers. In-protocol PBS (ePBS) is on the roadmap: the protocol itself enforces the commitment cryptographically, dropping the relayer trust assumption. The demo walks the three-step flow.
Power-ups you unlock
Builders craft MEV-optimal blocks; proposers auction the slot
Proposer signs the WINNING header BEFORE the body is revealed
Builder reveals the body to claim payment — withholding fails them too
Out-of-protocol today (MEV-Boost + relayers); ePBS is on the roadmap
Specialization: builders run MEV, proposers run validators
The Reentrancy Reaper attacks — common mistakes
Assuming the proposer assembles the block — under PBS the builder does
Trusting relayers as if they were the protocol (a temporary trust point)
Ignoring the builder bid market — it is competitive
Conflating MEV-Boost with in-protocol PBS
Boss battleWalk the PBS flow for three competing builders and identify which header the proposer signs.